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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE
BRITISH DOMINIONSt
By C. D. ALLIN*
T HE British Dominions were keenly disappointed at the
failure of the United States Senate to consent to the ratifi-
cation of the Covenant of the League. They had expected that
the United States would take the lead in welcoming them into
the new association of states, but instead of that they were greatly
surprised to find that the special recognition of their interna-
tional status by the League was subjected to special criticism in
the Senate and undoubtedly constituted one of the principal rea-
sons for the rejection of the Covenant. The effect of this defeat
was not only to weaken the power and prestige of the League.
but also to repudiate the tentative recognition which had been
accorded to them by President Wilson at the Peace Conference.1
The interesting situation was therefore presented that the Domin-
ions had acquired an international status so far as the League and
its members were concerned but that they still retained their old
colonial status in the eyes of the United States. There was a
strong suspicion in the Dominions that the attitude of the United
States Senate was determined -to a large degree by partisan con-
siderations and racial prejudices and that somehow or other they
had been made the innocent victims of American party politics.
The legal effect of the defeat of the League was evidenced
not long afterwards at the Washington Naval Disarmament Con-
ference. In sending out invitations to the Conference, Secretary
of State Hughes sent a single invitation to the British Empire
only 2 The failure to include the Dominions stirred up a hor-
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net's nest in certain portions of the Empire. General Smuts,
prime minister of the Union of South Africa, and the ablest repre-
sentative of the Nationalist cause in the British Commonwealth, at
once sent a strong protest to the other colonial ministers.
3
"I notice from press that you are sending representative to
Washington Conference. I do not know whether you have
received invitation from United States through British Govern-
ment or otherwise. Would very strongly urge that you should
press for such invitation before sending delegate. United States
did not ratify peace treaty to which we are signatories as com-
ponent independent states of British Empire. On the contrary,
agitation in Congress against our independent voting power in
League of Nations was direct challenge to new Dominion status.
This is first great international Conference after Paris and if
Dominions concerned are not invited and yet attend, bad prece-
dent will be set and Dominion status will suffer. If a stand is
made now and America acquiesces, battle for international recog-
nition of our equal status is finally won."
Premier Hughes of Australia heartily concurred in the view that
the Dominions should be granted separate representation. "The
whole Imperial conference, he subsequently explained in the
House of Representatives, "was of the opimon that Australia
and New Zealand ought to be represented at Washington.' It
was not until the United States of America objected to the sepa-
rate representation of the Dominions that they had relinquished
the effort." Mr. Meighen, the Canadian premier, likewise
declared that "it was essential that Dominion representatives
should hold the same status as at Paris and that their status
must not be allowed to be prejudiced by the proceedings at the
Washington Conference."5  Mr. Crerar, the leader of the Pro-
gressive party went even farther and declared that "Canada should
be represented at Washington in her own right or should not be
represented at all," a view which found hearty support in the
Manitoba Free Press, probably the most influential organ of Pro-
gressive thought in the country On the other hand, that staunch
old Imperialist paper, the Montreal Gazette, pointed out "that
Canada was not a sovereign state but a member of the British
Empire" and it was useless to expect that she would exercise any
influence at Washington in her own right when she had but a
the Limitation of Armament at Washington, 1921-22 Canada Sessional
Papers, 1922, Vol. 58, No. 47, p. 7.3Lowell, Canada's Treaty-Making Power, 2 Foreign Affairs, 15.
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small army and a petty navy It was enough that the parent
state Great Britain should be invited "to bring with him as many
of his children as he thought proper." The Nationalist views
of the other Dominions met with a decidedly hostile reception
from the New Zealand Government.7  That little colony had
always prided itself on being the most loyal part of the British
Empire and it was strongly inclined to look with disfavor upon
any project which might lead to the disintegration of the Empire.
Prime Minister Massey accordingly replied
"Our representative had sailed before your telegram came
to hand; but while the point you raise is important from certain
points of view, I consider it to be much more important that the
Empire should speak with one voice witf no uncertain sound."
Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, expressed his
complete accord with General Smuts' views as to the maintenance
of the new status of the Dominions. 8 But as the time for holding
the Conference was drawing near, it did not seem best to insist
upon separate invitations which would have necessitated a post-
ponement of the conference and might even have jeopardized its
success. To meet the criticism of the Dominion nationalists, the
British Government therefore arranged for the appointment of
four Dominion representatives to serve as members of the Brit-
ish delegation.9 According to the original plan, all the delegates
were to have been appointed by the British government but the
mode of nomination was now modified so as to bring it into con-
formity with the procedure at the Paris Conference, where the
Dominion delegates appeared with independent credentials from
their own governments." The Canadian Ministry, therefore,
adopted a special order in council authorizing the issuance by
His Majesty of the full power necessary to enable Sir Robert
Borden, the Canadian representative, to sign "for, and in the
name of, His Majesty, the King, in respect to the Dominion of
Canada, such treaties as might be concluded-at the Conference."'"
Much of the criticism of the United States' attitude on the
part of some of the Dominion Nationalists was quite beside the
mark. The action of the Department of State was in strict con-
6The Round Table. Mar. 1922. No. 46, p. 394.
7Ibid. Dec. 1922. No. 49, p. 221.
810 Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, 810.9Canada Sessional Papers, 1922, vol 18, No. 47, p. 46.10Ibid.
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formity with the principles and practices of international law.
The government merely proceeded on the basis of the status quo.
It had not extended any international recognition to the British
Dominions nor was it under the slightest legal or moral obliga-
tion to consult their wishes in the matter of representation or to
send them separate invitations. The composition of the British
delegation was a purely domestic matter which was no concern of
the United States. In any case there was no good reason why
the United States should run the risk of being snubbed by the
British government for attempting to determine the form of the
British representation.'2 The fact that the British government
in this case would have welcomed the separate representation of
the Dominions did not affect the general international principle
that the acknowledgment of the independence or the international
status of colonies should come in the first place from the Mother
Country rather than from outside nations. The premature recog-
nition of the international status of the British Dominions by the
United States or any foreign power might justly have been
regarded by Great Britain as an unfriendly act and a distinct
violation of the rules of international law.13
With the appointment of special Dominion representatives,
the questions at once arose, in what capacity were they to attend
the conference-as national or imperial delegates with full pow-
ers, or merely in an advisory capacity, and to what government or
governments would they be responsible for their conduct. The
opinion of the Dominion governments was divided upon this
question. In submitting the proposal to nominate delegates to
the conference, Prime Minister Hughes of Australia strongly
emphasized the Nationalist character of Dominion representa-
tion. 4
"He thought that the representative of Australia should be
one who is responsible to the people; he should go from that par-
liament instructed-for that was the proper term-as to what the
people of that country conceived to be that policy which would
best concern their interests and at the conclusion of his mission
he should come back and report to that parliament of which he
was a responsible member, and then it would be for the parlia-
ment and the people of Australia to express approval or disap-
proval of what he had done."
"-Herbert Smith. Diplomacy and International Status, 2 Canadian Bar
Rev. 241.
11 Moore, Digest of International Law 73.
143 Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire 105.
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According to this view, the Australian delegate was a national
delegate with a national responsibility to his own country and
not an imperial representative accountable to the English king
and parliament. This was the view, likewise, of the Canadian
government. The New Zealand Ministry, on the other hand,
assigned a much less pretentious role to the Dominion delegates.
In explaining the results of the Washington Conference in the
House of the Assembly, Premier Massey frankly declared that
he regarded the separate representation of the Dominions in the
League of Nations as an exceedingly dangerous innovation and
repudiated the idea that the Dominions should regard themselves
as independent nations or feel entitled to take an independent
stand upon questions of foreign policy at international confer-
ences or elsewhere.15 According to his conception, the Dominion
delegates participated in such conferences in a consultative capac-
ity to the British representatives rather than in virtue of any
independent right of their own even as members of the British
delegation.
"In all cases of foreign policy," he declared, "the British
prime minister speaks for the Dominions. In fact today the Right
Hon. Lloyd George is not only prime minister of the United
Kingdom but he is also prime minister of the Empire."
A similar difference of opinion presented itself in regard to
the powers of the Dominion delegates. The status of the Domin-
ion representatives, according to Sir Robert Borden, was equal
in all respects to that of their British colleagues.' 0
"Throughout the conference each delegate was in touch with
his own government by means of telegrams or the posts. Thus
no Dominion could be committed without its consent and each
was enabled to state its view and assert its influence in advance
of the formulation of agreements with other powers."
In the opinion of Sir John Salmond, the New Zealand repre-
sentative, on the other hand, there was a material difference in
their status and powers inasmuch as the Dominion delegates were
authorized to act on behalf of their respective Dominions only,
whereas the authority of the three British delegates covered the
whole Empire including those portions which were separately
represented by the Dominions.
"The British delegation, therefore, did not consist of seven
plempotentiaries possessed jointly of co-ordinate and general
1'5 bid. 1922. Vol. III, p. 877
16Canadian Sess. Papers, op. cit. .p. 45.
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authority. It consisted of three such plenipotentiaries, with
whom were associated the four Dominion representatives, each
of whom had authority in respect of his own Dominion only.
The legal significance of this distinction is, as I understand the
matter, that the Dominion delegates were present at Washington
for the purpose of being heard and consulted as to all matters
there in issue concerning the Empire, and of approving and con-
firming on behalf of their own Dominions the decisions of the
King's general plenipotentiaries, and of testifying such approval
and confirmation by signing on behalf of their own Dominions
the treaties there negotiated." 17
The procedure of the Washington Conference lent further
support to the theory that the Dominions' were there "not in their
own rights as quasi-independent states but merely as constituerit
portions of an undivided Empire." The representatives of the
Dominions, it is true, participated in the discussion and negotia-
tion on equal terms with the British delegates and the representa-
tives of foreign states but when the time for voting came the
separate representation of the Dominions disappeared and the
vote of the entire British delegation was given by Mr. Balfour
alone as head- of the delegation and on behalf of the whole
Empire.18 Whatever might be the internal differences of the
various members of the British delegation the final decision
showed the Empire acting as a diplomatic unit. Fortunately the
internal relations of the Imperial delegation were exceedingly
harmonious and no question aros6 upon which it was found im-
possible to secure final unammity of opinion.
There was also an interesting difference of opinion among
the colonial representatives as to the right of the Dominion dele-
gates to withhold assent to any agreement which might be entered
into by the imperial delegation.
According to the views of Sir Robert Borden :10
"In order to commit the British Empire delegation as a
whole, to any agreement reached at the Conference, the signature
of each Dominion delegate was necessary in addition to that of
the others, and any Dominion delegate could, if convinced or
instructed that his duty lay that way, reserve assent on behalf of
his government."
A more, imperialistic point of view was expressed by Sir John
Salmond.2 °
l7The Round Table, Dec. 1922, No. 49, p. 226.
'sIbid, p. 225.
19Canada Sess. Papers, op. cit. p. 44.20The Round Table, op. cit. p. 227'
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"If any Dominion delegate, either of his own motion or
under the instructions of his government, had found himself
unable to agree with some proposal which commended itself to
the Delegation, it would then have been necessary for His Majes-
ty's general plenipotentiaries from Great Britain to determine in
their own discretion the action to be taken.
"If they were of the opinion that the matter in dispute was
of such minor importance, or related so exclusively to the Domin-
ion itself, that the views of that Dominion ought to be acceded
to for the sake of unanimity, this result could have been attained
either by a modification of the terms of the proposed treaty or
by excluding the dissentient Dominion from its operation unless
and until it chose through its government or Parliament to give
its subsequent adherence. If, on the other hand, it was considered
that the matter was of such general importance that dissent on
the part of a Dominion should be disregarded in the interests of
the whole Empire, it would have been within the authority of the
plempotentianes of Great Britain to assent to the treaty on behalf
of the Empire as a whole, without regard to such dissent.
"The fact that the delegate of one of the British Dominions
had failed to sign the treaty on behalf of that Dominion would
have had no effect on the international operation and obligation
of the treaty. Any difficulty so unfortunately resulting would
have been a matter for negotiation and settlement within the
borders of the Empire itself, but would have in no way affected
the external relations between the Empire and the other contract-
ing Powers."
The procedure adopted in signing and ratifying the treaties
was that of the treaty of Versailles and other treaties concluded
at Paris, the representatives of the Dominions signed on behalf of
their respective Dominions along with the representatives of the
British Empire. 21 By this process the amour propre of the Domin-
ions was satisfied, since they were accorded an independent posi-
tion along with the other delegates. In accordance with the con-
stitutional usage of the Empire, the treaties were thereupon sub-
mitted to the parliaments of the respective dominions for approv-
al. In the words of Sir Robert Borden
"The constitutional convention of the British Empire, under
which the final act of ratification by the King of a treaty signed
on behalf of a Dominion must be based on the assent of that
Dominion, was fixed by the practice of recent years worked out
between the members of the Empire themselves. As that practice
is entirely within the control and determination of the nations of
the Empire, the Washington treaties do not affect it. In like case
is the question whether the treaties shall be submitted to Parlia-
21Canada Sess. Papers. op. cit. p. 43.
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ment for approval before ratification is recommended, although in
this respect the practice is determined by each part of the Empire
for itself; for example, it appears from the speech of His Excel-
lency at the opening of the present session that with respect to the
Washington Treaties the government consider that the 'approval
of Parliament ought to precede their ratification on behalf of
Canada.' 
22
This procedure partly justified the contention of some of the
Dominion governments that their assent was necessary to the
validity and operation of the treaties within their respective
Dominions. From a strictly legal standpoint, however, it must
be admitted that neither signature nor ratification on the part of
the Dominions was necessary to give effect to the Washington
conventions.
"The Washington treaties," as Sir John Salmond pointed
out,2 '3 "like all others which are negotiated by plenipotentiaries,
come into force only by ratification. The ratification required by
the constitutional law of the British Empire is that of His
Majesty. No action on the part of New Zealand is legally re-
quired. In view, however, of the direct participation of New
Zealand in the negotiation and execution of those treaties, it may
well be thought expedient that the treaties should be submitted
to both Houses of the New Zealand Legislature in order that
resolutions may be passed approving of their ratification by His
Majesty."
This elaborate procedure in connection with the signing and
ratification of the treaties was an ingenious attempt to reconcile
the principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire in its interna-
tional relations with the constitutional doctrine of the coordinate
right of national self-government on the part of the several
Dominions. But this formal procedure could not hide the fact
that the international aspirations of General Smuts and his sup-
porters had -been frustrated on this occasion. In the face of the
proceedings of the Washington Conference, it was no longer
possible to declare from the standpoint of international law, that
the Dominions had attained a status of equality with the Mother
Country and the sovereign nations of the world. In all their
formal aspects, the preamble, preliminary statement of purpose,
the recital of the names of the plenipotentiaries, the signature and
ratification, the treaties recognized the British Empire only as the
contracting party. The Dominions secured recognition simply as
22Thbi
2 3The Round Table, op. cit. p. 227.
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constituent parts of the Empire and not as separate and distinct
states.
The signature of the Dominion delegates and the ratification
by the Dominion parliaments are important therefore from the
constitutional rather than from the international standpoint. The
chief international significance lay in the fact that it intimated to
outside nations that they must consider the interests of the Domin-
ions in carrying on their diplomatic relations with the British
Empire since the direction of the foreign policy of the Empire
was no longer in actual practice vested exclusively in the hands
of the British Foreign Office. There was always the possibility
in case of the sacrifice of the national interests of a Dominion
that constitutional difficulties might arise through a refusal of the
aggrieved Dominion to sign or ratify the agreement in question.
"The true significance of the presence of representatives of
the Dommions at the Conference," in the words of Sir John Sal-
mond, "is not that those Dominions have acquired for either inter-
national or constitutional purposes any form of independent
status but that they have now been given a voice in the manage-
ment of the international relations of the British Empire as a
single undivided unity, relations which were formerly within the
exclusive control of the government of Great Britain. '2 4
The views of Sir John Salmond, it will be observed, differed
not only from those of General Smuts in respect to the interna-
tional status of the Dominions, but likewise from those of Sir
Robert Borden in respect to their constitutional status. Sir John,
as a thorough-going imperialist, asserted most strongly, the con-
stitutional as well as the international unity of the Empire,
whereas Sir Robert Borden attempted to lay down an intermedi-
ate position between the extreme national school of thought of
General Smuts and the imperialist views of the New Zealand
statesman. The Canadian leader was willing to concede that the
Empire should be a unit in its international policy but he put
forward the theory of the constitutional equality of the Domin-
ions with the Mother Country in the determination of their own
foreign policies-a theory which was emphatically repudiated by
the New -Zealand jurist. This conflict of views was partly due
to a difference in the political philosophy of the two' colonial
statesmen. Sir Robert Borden combined in his political creed
strong nationalist sentiments with a deep attachment to the Brit-
ish connection.
24Ibid, p. 225.
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"I have never wavered," he declared '" on another occasion,
"in the firm and constant belief thdt within the British Common-
wealth of nations Canada will find her most commanding influ-
ence, her widest usefulness and her highest destiny. With this
opinion is coupled a fixed and absolute conviction that the unity
of the Empire can alone find its expression in complete autonomy.
and in equality of nationhood. A strong Canadian national spirit
is entirely consistent with a firm purpose to maintain our country
in a high place within the British Commonwealth."
Sir John Salmond, on the other hand, was an out and out Imper-
ialist, who placed his allegiance to the British Empire above his
citizenship in the Dominion. But this difference in view was
likewise due in part to a difference in the legal and constitutional
modes of interpreting the Imperial constitution. Sir John Sal-
mond, throughout his discussion, adopted a strictly legal point of
view. He looked only to the letter of the law which recognized
the supreme authority of the British king and government in
foreign affairs. Sir Robert Borden, on the other hand, was
chiefly concerned with the practical workings of the Imperial
constitution. The great unwritten constitution of the empire in
the eyes of Sir Robert Borden, was essentially a political and
not a legal instrument of government. The powers of the king
in respect to Dominion affairs should therefore be exercised in
accordance with the same political understandings as were oper-
ative in matters of English domestic policy. He must follow the
advice of his colonial ministers on Dominion affairs and afford
them an opportunity to express an independent judgment on mat-
ters of general imperial concern.
With this phase of the controversy, however, foreign states
had nothing to do. They were concerned only with the interna-
tional status of the Empire and not with its internal economy. As
the treaty-making power was still legally lodged in the hands of
the King in his imperial capacity, they could deal only with the
British government and its accredited agents. From the stand-
point of' international law, the treaties were made between the
United States, Great Britain and the other sovereign states
represented in the Conference; the Dominions were not indepen-
dent parties to any of these conventions.
The next important development in the international status
of the Dominions arose out of a demand for separate diplomatic
25SBorden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, p. 138.
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representation. The Canadian government had long been dissat-
isfied with the diplomatic method of dealing with the government
at Washington through the British Foreign Office. Canada had
developed distinctive interests of her own and it was felt that
these interests could best be represented by a Canadian diplomat.
On more than one occasion the Canadian public had been made
to feel that their interests at Washington had been sacrificed by
the ignorance or indifference of the British Ambassador and the
lukewarm support of the English government. From time to
time special missions had been sent from Ottawa to Washington
to assist the British ambassador in carrying on negotiations with
the American government on Canadian affairs. 20  Propositions
had likewise been advanced in the Canadian House of Commons
for the establishment of a permanent embassy at Washington,
but all of these proposals had been defeated. Several United
States secretaries of state had likewise suggested the advisability
of establishing more direct relations between the two countries.
Secretary Bayard had been particularly impressed by the diffi-
culty of dealing with the Canadian government through London
during the course of the negotiations over the Northeastern fish-
eries. In a letter to Sir Charles Tupper in 1887 he declared :21
"In the very short interview afforded by your visit I referred
to the embarrassment arising out of the gradual practical eman-
cipation of Canada from the control of the Mother Country and
the consequent assumption by that Community of attributes of
autonomous and separate sovereignty, not, however, distinct from
the Empire of Great Britain. The awkwardness of this imper-
fectly developed sovereignty is felt most strongly by the United
States, which can not have formal relations with Canada, except
indirectly and as a colonial dependency of the British Crown,
and nothing could better illustrate the embarrassment arising
from this amorphous condition of things than the volumes of
correspondence published severally this year relating to the fish-
eries by the United States, Great Britain and the Government of
the Dominion. The time lost in this circumlocution, although
often regrettable, was the least part of the difficulty, and the
indirectness of appeal and reply was the most serious feature,
ending as it did, very unsatisfactorily"
As a large proportion of the diplomatic difficulties between the
British government and the United States arose over Canadian
2 8Speech of Sir Robert Borden, Apr. 21, 1921. Canada Debates
House of Commons, 1921, Vol. III, p. 2378.2 7Ibid, 2380.
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questions, there were manifest advantages in entrusting the nego-
tidtion and settlement of such issues to a Canadian representative.
-But these various propositions all came to naught. The British
Foreign Office and the ambassadors at Washington were not fav-
orable to any division of diplomatic authority and the leaders of
the Conservative government at Ottawa were likewise opposed
tG any measures which might bear the appearance of dismember-
ment of the Empire or the cultivation of too intimate relations
with the United States.
The question was again forced to the front during the World
War. The political and commercial relations of Canada and the
United States became so intimate that the Canadian government
found it necessary to maintain a permanent commercial mission
at Washington to deal with the heads of the various departments
which were directly concerned with the prosecution of the war."8
But this method of doing business proved so cumbersome that
Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Premier, took occasion during
the conferences in London and Paris in 1918 and 1919 to urge
upon the British government "the importance and desirability of
direct diplomatic representation of Canada at Washington."
There was considerable hesitation at first on the part of the Brit-
ish authorities, particularly of the Foreign Office, to accede to
this request as it was felt that "it might be taken to import a
lessening of the ties which connected Canada with Great Britain
and her sister nations.29 Nor was it easy to determine in advance
what should be the nature and functions of the office or the rela-
tions of the proposed colonial minister to the British ambassa-
dor. An arrangement, however, was finally agreed upon in 1920
to the following effect:"°
"As a result of recent discussions an arrangement has been
concluded between the British and Canadian governments to pro-
vide more complete representation at Washington of Canadian
interests than hitherto existed. Accordingly, it has been agreed
that His Majesty, on advice of his Canadian Ministers, shall
appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary who will have charge of Cana-
dian affairs and will at all times be the ordinary channel of cona-
munication with the United States Government in matters of
purely Canadian concern, acting upon instructions from, and
reporting direct to, the Canadian Government. In the absence
28Ibid, 2388.
2 9British Parl. Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 57, p. 1002.3OCanada Pan. Debates, House of Commons, May 10, 1920, Vol III,
p. 2177.
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of the Ambassador, the Canadian Minister will take charge of
the whole embassy and of the representation of Imperial as well
as Canadian interests. He will be accredited by His Majesty to
the president with the necessary powers for the purpose.
"This new arrangement will not denote any departure either
on the part of the British Government or of the Canadian Gov-
ernment from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the British
Empire.
"The need for this important step has been fully realized by
both governments for some time. For a good many years there
has been direct communication between Washington and Ottawa,
but the constantly increasing importance of Canadian interests in
the United States has made it apparent that Canada should be
represented there in some distinctive manner, for this would
doubtless tend to expedite negotiations, and naturally first hand
acquaintance with Canadian conditions would promote good un-
derstanding. In view of the peculiarly close relations that have
always existed between the people of Canada and those of the
United States, it is confidently expected as well that this new
step will have the very desirable result of maintaining and
strengthening the friendly relations and cobperation between the
British Empire and the United States."
The British Government, it would appear, was anxious to meet
the wishes of the Canadian government in the matter but was
very dubious as to the practicability of dual representation.
Canada, on the other hand, would not accept a subordinate posi-
tion in the British embassy, nor was it willing that the Canadian
minister should assume Imperial responsibilities similar to those
of the British ambassador. A compromise plan was accordingly
devised which would assure to the Canadian representative full
liberty of action in Canadian affairs and at the same time maintain
the closest co6peration with the British ambassador.
In the debate in the House of Commons, June, 1920, on a
motion by Hon. N. W Rowell to appropriate $90,000 for a
Canadian embassy to the United States, unexpected opposition
was encountered from the opposition benches.31  In the past,
the Liberal party had been the special champion of the cause of
special representation at Washington, but on this occasion Mr.
Fielding, former minister of finance, proved himself to be the
most hopeless of the "Little Colonials" in his national outlook.
The existing diplomatic arrangements, he maintained,8" were
working satisfactorily It would be much better to continue the
31Ibid, June 30, 1920. Vol. V, p. 4533.32Ibid, p. 4534
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practice of sending special missions to Washington than to set
-up a desk for a Canadian representative in the British embassy,
where he would be under the influence of the British Foreign
Office. But this provincial viewpoint did not commend itself to
a majority of the members of the House. Mr. McMaster, one
of the prominent members of the Progressive party, warmly com-
mended33 the principle of establishing a separate Canadian em-
bassy, but at the same time objected most strongly to the propo-
sition that the Canadian minister should take charge of the
affairs of the whole embassy in the absence of the British ambas-
sador. This proposal, he urged, would bring about a confused
and divided responsibility since the Canadian representative could
not be responsible to his own and to the British Government at
one and the same time. In reply to the criticisms of the opposi-
.tion, Sir Robert Borden pointed out 4 that from two-thirds to
three-fourths of the business of the British embassy related to
Canadian matters: That these interests could best be promoted
by a Canadian representative had been clearly demonstrated by
the successful operation of the International Waterways Com-
mission on which Canadian representatives sat side by side with
those of the United States. So far as the constitutional question
of responsibility was concerned, the Canadian minister when act-
ing in the place of the British ambassador "would occupy exactly
the same position as the British ambassador had occupied in the
past. In matters of purely Imperial concern, he would act under
the direction of the Imperial government; in matters of purely
Canadian concern, he would consult with, and act according to,
the views of this government." But this explanation did not
satisfy Mr. King, the Liberal leader, who declared 5 that the
provision for the Canadian representative to take charge of
Imperial interests would lead to difficulty not only between
Canada and Great Britain but also between Canada and the
United States. An amendment to reduce the item was, however,
defeated by a straight party vote of thirty-two to fifty-seven.
The debate was renewed the following session with even
greater zest. Several strong Imperialists in the House from both
the Liberal and Conservative parties strongly opposed the ap-





it was an attempt to assume a sovereign power which was beyond
the legal competency of the Dominion and moreover, would prove
incompatible with the maintenance of the British connection. Sir
Robert Borden again took the lead in emphasizing the need for
an early appointment of a Canadian representative. 0 This inno-
vation, he argued, was merely an extension of the principle of
colonial autonomy which was already operative in the field of
domestic legislation.
"The appointment of the proposed minister, he asserted,
would be made by the King upon the advice of his Canadian
government in Canada. It has been repeatedly pointed that the
same King acts by the advice of his Parliament in Great Britain,
by the advice of his Parliament in Canada and by the advice of
his legislature in every province of Canada, that is, sovereignty is
divisible so far as domestic relations are concerned. I should
like to tell the Honorable member for Shelburne and Queens
(Hon. W S. Fielding) that there is good ground in the opinion
of some constitutional writers to hold that sovereignty in respect
to foreign relations is also divisible in somewhat the same sense.
Whether that be true or not, there is no question about it in this
case because the minister who is to be charged especially with the
interests of Canada in relation to the United States will be ap-
pointed by His.Majesty the King of the whole Empire and there-
fore the king of Canada upon the nomination and recommenda-
tion of the King's Privy Council for Canada."
This view was vigorously supported by the Hon. N. W Rowell
in an even stronger nationalistic speech.37 The sovereignty of the
British government and parliament, he alleged, was now essen-
tially a legal fiction. For all practical purposes, the several
states of the Empire today stood upon an equal footing with the
mother country in respect to foreign as well as domestic affairs,
as was clearly evidenced by their status in the League of
Nations. There was no danger, he argued, of a conflict between
the British and Canadian ministers at Washington.
"The Canadian representative would have no authority to
enter into a controversy with a British ambassador and I think
that the converse was also true. If any question or difficulty did
arise it would naturally, properly, inevitably come back to the
government of Canada and the government of Great Britain and
would be settled between them just as all questions are settled
from time to time by conference and negotiation. The functions
of the Canadian minister would be the same as those of any other
foreign diplomat."
36Ibid, Apr. 21, 1921, Vol. III, p. 2378.
37Ibid, p. 2394.
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Prime Minister Meighen explained that he had not yet "decided
on the best man to fill this very important position." 3  The
reason for authorizing the Canadian representative to act during
the absence of the British ambassador was to give him "a rank-
such as he should have. He is in a position second in authority
and would naturally take over the duties of the British ambassa-
dor in the absence of the first in authority." He did not antici-
pate that any difficulty would arise from this arrangement inas-
much as the British government was ready to repose all confi-
dence in anyone recommended by the Canadian government for
such an important post.
The opposition leaders on this occasion were more favor-
able to the proposal. Mr. T. A. Crerar, the Progressive leader,
heartily supported the motion but was inclined to criticize the
government for the delay in making the appointment. The
Liberal leader, Mackenzie King, renewed his objections to the
confusion of Imperial and Canadian interests at Washington,
but at the same time warmly commended the appointment of a
Canadian.39 He concurred in the view of Mr. Rowell that "a
Canadian minister should have the same right or authority to
make a treaty in the name of the king as any minister of the
British government." This was the view, likewise, which the
British Foreign Secreta-ry expressed in 1908 in respect to negotia-
tions etween the Canadian and Chinese governments on the ques-
tion of immigration. At that time Sir Edward Gray took the
position "that a minister of the Crown in Canada had as much
right to act-in the name of the sovereign as any minister bf the
Crown in Great Britain and that a minister of the Crown in
Canada might receive from the King of England the same
authority to act in the negotiating and signing of a treaty as could
be given to any British minister." On the other hand, several
members of the House were inclined to fear that the association
of the Canadian minister with the British ambassador mght result
in a loss of independence on the part of the Canadian representa-
tive. They took particular exception to the proposal that the
Canadian representative should assume any of the duties of the
Imperial ambassador. The two offices, in their judgment, should
be kept entirely distinct and independent of one another. But
38Ibid, p. 2400.39Ibid, p. 2410.
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neither the extreme Nationalist nor the Imperialist groups ven-
tured to challenge the House to a division. The strong support
which was given to the appointment by the leaders of all three
parties was too much for the feeble opposition and the motion
for the adoption of the item was carried without a division.
Shortly after the Conservative government was defeated at
the general election and resigned without having filled the post
at Washington. On the advent of the Liberal government to
office it was expected that an early appointment would be made,
but up to the present no action has been taken in the matter.
The position, it is currently reported, has been offered to several
prominent Canadian leaders, but none of them has yet scen fit
to accept the nomination. These repeated postponements have
aroused a suspicion among the Nationalists that the British
Foreign Office was still offering objections to the appointment
but no evidence has been presented to support this innuendo.10
In reply to a recent question. Premier King stated that he ex-
pected to announce an appointment in the near future.
Thanks to this delay, the Irish Free State has carried off the
honor of appointing the first Dominion representative at Wash-
ington. The new Irish Government, as was to be expected, was
exceedingly anxious both for political and sentimental reasons,
to set up direct relations with the United States. To this end it
requested the British Government in conformity with the
Canadian precedent of 1920, "to ask the government of the United
States to receive a minister plenipotentiary accredited by His
Majesty to the president and furnished with credentials enabling
him to take charge of all affairs relating only to the Irish Free
State. 14  Fortunately for the Irish Nationalists, a friendly Labor
government was in office at Westminster which readily agreed to
support the proposal.
This proposal at once raised a number of difficult questions
in respect to the powers of the Irish minister, his relation to the
British embassy at Washington, and his responsibility to the Irish
or British governments. These questions were thrashed out iii a
characteristic informal manner by the English Colonial Secretary
and the Irish Free State Minister for External Affairs. Ah agree-
40The Round Table, Dec. 1921, No. 45, p. 171, Dennis, British Foreign
Policy and the Dominions. 16 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 598.41British Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, June 26, 1924.
Vol. 175, p. 596.
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ment was reached by which, in the words of Hon. G. H. Thomas
in the House of Commons,
"while the Free State Minister would be the official channel of
communication with the United States Government for dealing
with matters exclusively affecting the Free State, the principle
of the Resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1923 as to the
Negotiation, Signature and Ratification of Treaties and, in
particular, of that part of the Resolution which relates to the
conduct of matters affecting more than one part of the Empire,
would apply generally to all questions with which he dealt.
"If, any doubt should arise whether any particular question
exclusively concerned the Free State, the point would, if possible,
be settled by consultation between the Free State Minister and the
Ambassador. If the matter could not be settled by such con-
sultation, it would be referred to the British Government and the
Free State Government. In order to meet the possibility that any
particular question might in its initial stages be exclusively of con-
cern to the Free State, and might subsequently prove to be of
concern to other parts of the Empire, the Free State Minister
would keep in close contact with the Ambassador.
"While the Free State Minister would not purport to deal
with matters affecting the Empire as a whole, the assistance of
the Ambassador and his staff would be at his disposal, if desired.
The Ambassador would not, however, be in any way responsible
for action taken by the Free State Minister, nor would the latter
be in any way subject to the Ambassador's control."' 2
The Irish agreement, it will be observed, followed along the same
general lines as the Canadian precedent, save in one respect,
namely, that the Free State Minister was not empowered to take
over the duties of the British Ambassador during the latter's
absence.
In the debate in the House of Lords upon the question, the
Earl of Selborne urged that'"
"His Majesty's government should use the whole of their
influence not to allow this development or experiment to be
launched haphazard. It should only be done deliberately and
after a complete and mutual understanding between all the
Dominions of the British Empire and His Majesty's government
as to how the action of their ministers were to be harmonized
with the action of His Majesty's government. Above all, there
should be by mutual agreement an exact limitation of the action
and responsibility of each representative."
In reply, Lord. Arnold, under-secretary of state for the colonies,
42Ibid, p. 597.
43British Pariamentary Debates, House of Lords, June 25, 1924, VoL
57, p. 997.
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pointed out that the government was simply following the
Canadian precedent. 4" Ireland had such direct and particular
interests in the United States that His Majesty's government
agreed with the Irish Free State 'in thinking that these interests
could be most conveniently handled by an Irish diplomat. It was
clearly understood that the functions of the Irish Minister would
be limited exclusively to Irish affairs. Lord Parmoor, speaking
on behalf of the Foreign Office,45 further explained that the Irish
minister "would receive his credentials in the usual manner from
His Majesty, his letter of appointment being issued by the Free
State Government." The government had made it clear in its
instruction to Sir Auckland Geddes that the new appointment did
not involve any departure from the principle of the diplomatic
unity of the Empire. The Free State minister would receive
his instructions from his own government only and would not be
concerned in any way with imperial questions.
The speech of Lord Curzon, former foreign secretary, clearly
revealed 4 the hostile attitude of the previous Unionist govern-
ment and at the same time threw considerable light upon the
difficulties which the Canadian government had encountered in
putting through its proposal. This innovation, he declared, might
have a most important effect upon the future of the Empire. The
Foreign Office had viewed the Canadian proposal with serious
apprehension and it was only with great reluctance that it had
acquiesced in it. The Canadian Government had also begun to
question the wisdom of carrying out the plan for it had found it
difficult to secure a satisfactory person to accept the appoint-
ment, "and the attitude of the United States was itself doubtful."
To complicate matters still further, two of the Dominion prime
ministers at the recent imperial conference, namely Bruce of
Australia and Massey of New Zealand, had strongly objected to
the policy of separate representation. "No agreement, he con-
cluded, "should have been made by private negotiation with the
Irish government until the whole question had been laid before
an imperial conference for general determination." Lord Chan-
cellor Haldane47 in summing up the case on behalf of the govern-
ment, emphatically repudiated the whole philosophy of the Tory
Imperialism. "It was impossible," he declared, "to govern the
441bid, p. 998.
45Ibid, p. 1000.48Ibid, p. 1001.
47Ibid, p. 1006.
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Dominions otherwise than in accordance with their will and their
own wishes." The unity of the Empire could best be preserved
on the basis of freedom. Australia and New Zealand, it was
true, had not yet asked for separate representation at Washing-
ton but should they do so he could see no reason for demurring
to their request. The right to diplomatic representation was in-
volved in the possession of a Dominion status. The late Unionist
government, of which Lord Curzon was a member, had recog-
nized the validity of that proposition in the case of Canada and
it could not now deny its applicability to other Dominions. The
speech of the Lord Chancellor was decisive. There was no
escape either from the facts or from the conclusion of his argu-
ment. A few of the Tory lords continued to criticize theaction
of the government but they did not dare to divide the House upon
the question.
Shortly afterwards, upon receiving a favorable reply from
the United States government, the King duly accredited Professor
Smiddy of Cork University as the first minister plenipotentiary
of the Free State at Washington.
The successful working of this arrangement, it is obvious,
will depend upon the mutual forbearance of the British and Irish
representatives and above all else, upon the maintenance of har-
monious relations between the English and Irish governments.
Both the Canadian and Irish agreements are based on the assump-
tion of reciprocal good faith and credit on the part of all the states
of the Empire in their relations to one another as well as towards
the outside world. From a legal standpoint, there is nothing to
prevent the Irish minister at Washington, or any future Dominion
representative, from pursuing an independent policy which might
be injurious to other parts of the Empire. These concessions
represent, therefore, a supreme act of political faith on the part
of the Mother Country in the democracies of the Dominions.
The United States Government, it is interesting to observe,
has not reciprocated the diplomatic advances of the Free State.
Ireland has appointed a representative at Washington but the
United States has not returned the compliment by sending a
diplomat to Dublin. The American ambassador at London
still remains the. only accredited representative of the
United States to the British Empire. From the stand-
point of the American government, the British Empire
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is a unit at London even though it may be divided
at Washington. As a general proposition, it is much more con-
venient to handle the particular concerns of Ireland through the
Irish minister at Washington but the American ambassador in
London is still legally competent to carry on negotiations with
Ireland through the British Foreign Office and would doubtless be
consulted if the interests of the British Empire were found to be
materially affected by the course of the Irish-American negotia-
tions. The United States Government, we may then conclude,
has been pleased to accord to Ireland a limited international
status in respect to Irish as distinguished from Imperial concerns,
but it has been careful not to concede to it the position of a
sovereign or independent state with which it must deal on terms
of diplomatic equality, as is the case in its relations with the
British Empire.
In truth, the appointment of an Irish minister at Washington
partakes in some respects even more of the character of an ad-
numstrative arrangement for the more convenient dispatch of
business than of a diplomatic appointment by a sovereign state
according to well-understood principles of international law 4"
The British Empire is free to carry on its business with Wash-
ington through one or one-half dozen \representatives if the
United States is willing to receive that number. The mere fact
that the American Government agrees to receive an Irish minister
does not necessarily involve a recognition on the part of either
the British or the United States governments of a full and com-
plete international status for Ireland. In many of the older
federal unions such as the Swiss Confederation, the Hanseatic
League, and the Holy Roman Empire, the component members
enjoyed a limited right of sending and receiving ambassadors.
The German imperial constitution expressly recognized the right
of Bavaria to separate representation, but the Bavarian ministers
at the various European capitals were never admitted into the
diplomatic corps on terms of equality with the representatives of
sovereign states.4 9  The same principle was exemplified in the
appointment by Great Britain of a special diplomatic representa-
tive to the Vatican since the appointment was made with the full
approval and consent of the Italian government. The real ques-
tion at issue is not one as to the form or dignity of the appoint-
48Herbert Smith, op. cit. p. 239.
491 Oppenheim, International Law, 5th ed., Sec. 361.
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ment but as to the legal and political authority for making the
same.50  By whom was the Irish minister appointed-by the
British or the Irish government? And in what capacity did he
proceed to the United States, as a British colonial or an inde-
pendent Irish minister? The fact that he received lus credentials
from the king would raise a presumption in the first instance
that he was considered a British representative unless it could be
shown that he had been appointed by the king on the advice of the
Irish ministry and not of the Imperial cabinet. The further
fact that the arrangement for the appointment was worked out
between the English colonial secretary and the Irish minister for
external affairs, lend support to the theory of the colonial
character of the Irish minister. If the agreement had been drawn
up by the British Foreign Office and the Irish government, the
presumption might have been contrariwise. The two govern-
ments would then have negotiated on terms of equality and it
would be right to assume that the appointment of the new min-
ister constituted a formal recognition on the part of the English
Crown of the international status of Ireland. On the other hand,
it must be admitted that the Irish Government did not fail to
proclaim on the housetops that the Irish minister was nominated
by the Irish cabinet, received his specific instructions only from
the Irish government and was going to Washington as the
exclusive representative of the Free State, and the British
Government has not seen fit to challenge the correctness of any
of these statements either officially or unofficially. The gentle-
men's agreement between the two governments, moreover, ex-
pressly recognized that the Irish ministers should be subject
solely and exclusively to the government at Dublin. There is a
manifest incompatibility between the theory of an im-
perial appointment and the admitted constitutional fact of
Irish responsibility for the acts of the Irish representative.
Power and responsibility, according to the principles of the Eng-
lish constitution, should go' hand in hand. The actual facts of
the case, moreover, strongly support this construction whatever
the legal theory of the law officers of the Crown may be. The
Irish situation was so critical at the time that the British Govern-
ment did not venture to discuss the constitutional and interna-
tional significance of the appointment for fear of upsetting the
50Smith, op. cit., p. 241.
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whole Irish settlement. In short, the Irish were permitted to win
their case by default. The facts determined the law for the time
being. British statesmen were not concerned with legal theories
and were only too glad to throw off on the jurists the responsi-
bility of working out a constitutional theory which would satis-
factorily explain the real political situation.
It is manifest, therefore, in these recent controversies, that
the international status of the Dominions is still somewhat doubt-
ful. They have some of the characteristics of both colonies and
states. So far as imperial matters are concerned, they are still
colonial dependencies in relation to the outside world. But at
the same time they have gained a limited international status by
reason of their membership in the League of Nations and their
special diplomatic and treaty relations with certain outside states.
But these relations, it must be understood, are expressly restricted
to their own particular domestic interests. They are states but
not sovereign states.
